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1. Now that Petro Poroshenko has been convincingly elected President of Ukraine, notwithstanding 
practical problems in some eastern regions, there should be a new fresh start for Ukraine and its 
relations with both the EU and Russia. Putin could try harder to contribute to peace in Eastern 
Ukraine.  
Poroshenko’s first objective is to secure the peace and unity of Ukraine. The Maidan 
should be dismantled, the armed militias disbanded and, as regards Donetsk and 
Lugansk, Russia could help the process by advising Russian-flag-waving people in the 
eastern regions to cooperate. Putin says he respects the results, but he could do more to 
influence his ‘compatriots’ in Eastern Ukraine, thus facilitating the end to military 
operations by Kyiv. Russian official discourse and the mass media should stop their 
gross propaganda about so-called ‘fascists’ running Kyiv. Dmytro Yarosh of the Right 
Sector and Oleh Tyahnybok of Svoboda collected 1% each of the vote, and so Ukraine 
voted overwhelmingly against violent extremism. Russia’s own neo-Nazis would score 
much better.  
2. Ukraine could join with Georgia and Moldova to complete the signing of its Association 
Agreement with the EU (notably to now include its DCFTA) on 27 June. 
 Ukraine could sign soon after Poroshenko’s inauguration. And to sign with 
Georgia and Moldova would reverse the Vilnius fiasco and give vital credibility 
to the EU’s Eastern Partnership process. 
3. Ukraine would declare its intention not to join any military alliance and to write that into the 
constitution. 
Russia wants a pledge of neutrality from Ukraine to guarantee against its future NATO 
membership, while many NATO member states do not see a compelling case for 
Ukrainian membership. The EU has several member states that have their own formula 
for either neutrality or non-NATO membership (which are not the same things) – 
Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Cyprus and Malta.  
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4. Ukraine would complete the revision of its constitution, including appropriate safeguards for the 
Russian language. 
This should be an easily manageable problem. Europe has numerous examples of bi- or 
multi-lingualism being handled in a sustainable way: Swedish in Finland; French, 
Flemish and German in Belgium; Catalan and Spanish in Catalonia; French, German 
and Italian in Switzerland; Welsh and English in Wales; Italian and German in Italian 
Tyrol, etc. There are a number of well-identified policy variables that are negotiable: 
language regimes in schools, public mass media, dealings with local administrations 
and practice in central government institutions. A bi- or multi-lingual regime may 
involve federalism, but it does not have to. The challenge for Ukraine is in principle 
easier than for the cases just mentioned, since the Ukrainian and Russian languages are 
close brothers, and mutually understood by much of the population. 
5. Russia would agree to align the price of its gas sales to Ukraine on the average German import 
price, thereby removing this item from the political agenda once and for all. 
It is not sustainable for Gazprom to attempt to impose politically motivated, 
monopolistic prices, such as the $485/‘000m3 being currently demanded, when latest 
data for the average German import price is $360/‘000m3 in March. For Ukraine around 
$10-20 should be deducted for the shorter transport costs, and the price should then be 
indexed on the German price less the transport cost factor. Already reverse flows from 
Slovakia are beginning to circumvent uncompetitive Russian prices. Above all, the 
politicisation of this price means constant threats to the smooth supply of gas through 
Ukraine to Europe, and intensification of European efforts to go for alternative sources 
that are actually now quite abundant, which is not in Russia’s interest. Trilateral 
consultations are now underway with the European Commissioner for energy, Günther 
Oettinger, and there should be agreement on a formula like the above. 
6. Ukraine and the customs union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (RBK) would engage in 
negotiations for a high quality free trade agreement (FTA). 
It is clear now that Ukraine will not join the Russian-led customs union, which was a 
thoroughly bad idea economically from the beginning, as evidenced in various studies. 
Ukraine’s future prosperity will have to come from developing internationally 
competitive industries and their inclusion in European supply chain structures. To hide 
behind the relatively protective tariffs of the customs union would cut Ukraine off from 
the international economy, which is the opposite position of what is needed. On the 
other hand the current CIS vintage FTA should be much improved, and above all 
implemented properly by Russia without politically fabricated technical barriers to 
Ukrainian imports.   
7. The EU and Russia would examine together with Ukraine any unintended problems arising for 
Russia as a result of the DCFTA (completing a bilateral process that the EU and Russia initiated 
in 2013).  
There was a lot of disinformation spread by Viktor Yanukovich and his Prime Minister 
Mykola Azarov to justify reneging on signing the DCFTA, such as the insistence that 
the adoption of EU industrial standards would put the Ukrainian machine industry and 
major exporters to Russia out of business. In fact, the DCFTA allows complete freedom 
for Ukrainian exporters to follow whatever standards are required in the Russian 
market, and the adoption of European standards by Ukraine for its domestic market is 
intended to be a gradual process, with flexible provisions for accommodating problems 
that may arise (Ukraine may request extended timetables). 
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8. The EU would move rapidly to conclude visa-free agreements with Ukraine and Georgia, and 
towards this goal with Russia, notably with much facilitated 5-year multi-entry visas without 
delay. 
The crucial goal of implementing visa-free travel to the EU from Eastern Europe 
advances well. Moldova is already there as of 1 January 2014, and Ukraine and Georgia 
are in the final stages of the process of meeting EU conditions. For Russia there have 
been long negotiations over visa facilitation and the longer-term objective of visa 
liberalisation, in particular for visa-free travel for officials and greatly facilitated access 
to multi-year, multi-entry visas, which gets close to the same thing. Negotiations with 
Russia are currently suspended, but in the right political context, they could be rapidly 
re-activated and concluded in a positive manner. 
9. The EU, Russia and Ukraine would engage in a regular trilateral cooperation process, without 
prejudice to the effective independence of any party. They would promote projects of common 
interest, such as integrated transport and energy pipeline corridors. The process should be 
initiated with a trilateral summit.  
Trilateral dialogue or cooperation is hardly possible when the context is one of overt 
confrontation. However, if a context of well-established political benchmarks could be 
established (as under other points proposed here), then trust could be built up and 
cooperation developed. The simple fact that Ukraine occupies such a large place on the 
map between the EU and Russia means that there will always be a host of issues 
requiring trilateral cooperation, and of opportunities for new common ventures. But for 
such arrangements to flourish, the rules of the game have to be clear, balanced and well 
marked out. Given the depth of the Ukraine crisis, the initiation of positive movements 
in this direction will require clear commitment and personal trust at the highest level. 
The starting situation is manifestly at a low point, but the election of the new Ukrainian 
president could provide the moment to turn the page and start afresh in a positive 
direction. An obvious trilateral agenda item would be to ensure that the three (future) 
bilateral free trade arrangements around the EU-Ukraine-Russia triangle function 
efficiently without inconsistent provisions, and that future possible negotiations over 
‘Lisbon to Vladivostok’ (point 12) take the interests of all parties into account. Another 
item would be the modernisation of the trunk gas pipelines, as has been under 
discussion for some years. 
10. The EU and Russia would resume negotiations for a new basic agreement. 
This idea has been limping along for years without getting anywhere that the outsider 
can see. But with goodwill, there is much that could be done to deepen the cooperation 
between the two parties in many sectors beyond the trade sphere (which would be 
handled by the RBK customs union), including education, culture, research, industrial 
cooperation, etc. 
11. The EU and the RBK customs union would open negotiations for a FTA, on the understanding 
that Belarus and Kazakhstan would accede to the WTO during the course of the negotiations.  
The non-membership of WTO of Belarus and Kazakhstan is regarded by the European 
Commission to be grounds for refraining from opening free trade negotiations for 
‘Lisbon to Vladivostok’. There are legal reasons to support this position. However, the 
negotiations would doubtless take a long time in any case, so the EU could adopt the 
position of saying that the accession of Belarus and Kazakhstan would have to be 
completed before signing an agreement. This is the position taken by EFTA in their 
ongoing negotiations with the customs union.  
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12. Russia would propose its customs union partners to adopt European and international 
industrial standards for tradable goods as the standards of the Eurasian Economic Union. 
It is not clear what the customs union policy will be. Vague statements have been made 
about convergence on European and international standards, but the official documents 
of the Eurasian Economic Commission refer to some 7,000 standards, 4,000 of which 
would be GOCT standards (i.e. derived from old Soviet standards). Another view is 
that the standards will often copy European standards, subject only to local conformity 
assessment procedures, which will affix ‘EAC’ (Eurasian Conformity) marks like the 
EU’s ‘CE’ marks. But this is more than a technical matter, and would be fundamental in 
determining whether or not the Russian economy will become modernised and 
internationally competitive. Russian industry is in need of long-overdue domestic 
economic reforms, especially now that economic stagnation has set in (the official 
forecast for 2015 sees 0.5% growth of GDP), and the proposed free trade agreement 
(point 11) should include the transparent adoption of European industrial standards, 
which is essential for Russian industry to connect with European and international 
supply chains. 
13. The EU would scrap sanctions against Russia. 
No further comment required. 
14. The EU, Moldova (Chisinau and Transnistria) and Russia would work out arrangements for 
Transnistria to profit from Moldova’s signing of the DCFTA with the EU. Transnistria would 
be subject to an additional Protocol for basic free trade with the EU, with zero tariffs and 
acceptance of EU industrial standards.   
The present position is that the European Commission (Directorate-General for Trade) 
requires Transnistria’s acceptance of the complete DCFTA package (which includes 
compliance with 400 EU laws) in order to benefit from tariff-free access to the EU 
market. Not surprisingly, the result is deadlock, although Transnistria will still profit 
from existing preferences through 2015. The EU should see that it is in its political 
interest to take a more flexible position here, for example agreeing to simpler conditions 
for Transnistria. 
15. Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union needs special conditions in any case, since 
it has no common frontier with the RBK customs union. But Armenia now requests 900 
exemptions from the common external tariff, which makes its inclusion in the customs union 
technically implausible, if not impossible. Both the RBK customs union and the EU could 
arrange special free trade conditions with Armenia.  
Armenia’s manifest economic interest is to have basic free trade with both the RBK 
customs union and the EU. Given that its full accession to the RBK customs union is 
now deadlocked, practical solutions should be found, enabling simpler free trade with 
both the customs union and the EU, while Armenia could still otherwise integrate with 
the Eurasian Economic Union if it so wished.  
